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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Michelle Anderson has been charged with kidnapping her own child. She failed to 
deliver her child, P.A., to his father, Ricky Anderson, at the time appointed for Ricky's 
visitation. The reason for her flight was concern for P .A. 's safety. 
Michelle was charged with Kidnapping in the Second Degree, Idaho Code § 18-
4501(2). Because Michelle was charged with Kidnapping rather than Custodial Interference, 
she has been denied the opportunity to present her necessity defense to the jury-that she 
refused Ricky his visitation with P .A. because delivery of P .A. to Ricky would place the 
child in imminent harm. 1 
Idaho's kidnapping statute, in particular Section 18-4501(2), states that a person who 
kidnaps is one who 
leads, takes, entices away or detains a child under the age of sixteen (16) 
years, with intent to keep or conceal it from its custodial parent, guardian 
or other person having lawful care or control thereof, or with intent to 
steal any article upon the person of the child; 
Under the facts of this case, the Kidnapping charge against Michelle should be dismissed. 
Michelle could not have possibly violated this statute. 
An essential element of kidnapping is an intent on the part of the defendant "to keep 
or conceal" the child from its "custodial parent." Michelle could not have kept or concealed 
P .A. from the child's "custodial parent" because Michelle was P.A.' s "custodial parent." 
1 Decision and Order, R. pp. 323-331; Custodial Interference expressly grants the defendant an affirmative 
defense "if the action is taken to prevent the child from imminent physical harm." I.e. § 18-4506. 
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Ricky was granted "parenting time" and "visitation," but at the time Michelle allegedly 
kidnapped P .A., Ricky was not the "custodial parent." 
The Idaho legislature never intended for the kidnapping statute to apply against a 
custodial parent when the party aggrieved is the non-custodial parent. The legislature's 
intent is manifest in the adoption of the Custodial Interference statute. In contrast to Idaho's 
Kidnapping statute, Custodial Interference includes situations where one parent absconds 
with a child from a "parent or another person or institution having custody, joint custody, 
visitation or other parental rights." I.e. § 18-4506. Kidnapping appiies to interference with 
the parental rights of a "custodial parent"; Custodial Interference applies to interference 
with the parental rights of those with "visitation or other parental rights." 
The effect of including parents with visitation rights as "custodial parents" for 
purposes of Kidnapping would be to deprive Michelle of any opportunity to present her 
defense to the jury. It would also allow a mother with custody to be charged with the 
identical crime as had P.A. been abducted by a complete stranger. More generally, such an 
interpretation would invite every aggrieved parent involved in a custody dispute to demand 
police investigation and prosecution of kidnapping claims anytime a child is not timely 
delivered for visitation. The Idaho Legislature never intended such results. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Michelle and Ricky Anderson were married on May 27,1999. They had one child 
(referred to herein as "P .A.") born  Ricky initiated divorce proceedings in 
2007. Prior to finalization of the divorce, Michelle moved to Shelly, Idaho with P .A., and 
they resided with Michelle's parents. 
1. Ricky's parenting time was completely suspended from December 19; 2007 until 
February 6, 2008 due to concerns for P.A.'s safety. 
Michelle had verified concerns that P.A. was abused while in Ricky's care. 
Michelle's attorney filed a Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion to Suspend 
Father's Parenting Time along with Michelle's affidavit and the affidavit of Susan M. Heng, 
P.A.'s play therapist who had noticed several alarming behaviors in P.A. indicative of 
abuse. 2 The Montana court granted Michelle's motion on December 19, 2007 and 
temporarily terminated any contact between P .A. and Ricky. The court stated, 
The Court finds that if action is not taken on an emergency basis that the 
parties' minor child, [P .A.], may suffer emotional, and physical harm. 
Petitioner, Rick Anderson's parenting time, as allowed in the October 25, 
2006 Temporary Order, and arranged by the parties accordingly, shall be 
temporarily suspended, and he shall not be entitled to have parent-child 
contact with or remove from Respondent's care, absent mutual 
agreement of the parties. 
2 Memorandum, Affidavit of Michelle Anderson, Affidavit of Susan M. Heng, R. pp.lll-l23. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -6-
Respondent shall be entitled to have [P .A] in her sole custody until further 
Order of the Court. 3 
Ricky's visitation with P.A. was suspended until the Montana court issued a 
judgment including a Final Parenting Plan on February 6, 2008. 4 
2. Michelle's and Ricky's parental rights were defined by the Montana court's 
February 6, 2008 Parenting Plan. 
After the divorce trial, on February 6, 2008, the Montana State Court issued a decree 
of divorce and a parenting plan ("Parenting Pian,,).5 The Parenting Plan is contained in the 
Record on pages 52 to 58. 
The Parenting Plan reestablished Ricky's unsupervised visitation rights with P.A. 
Within the Parenting Plan, the Montana Court established a "Residential Schedule" 
provision. That provision states, 
RESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE. The child shall reside primarily with Michelle. 
Rick shall may [sic] have parenting time one week per month. After the child 
enters school, Rick's parenting time shall be two weekends per month. In 
addition, after the child enters school, the parties shall divide equally the 
summer visitation period. 6 
The Parenting Plan contains a provision entitled "Rights of Each Parent" that allows 
both parents equal authority and access to confer with P.A.' s school officials, physicians 
3 Order Suspending Father's Parenting Time, R. pp. 126-27. 
4 Notice of Entry of Judgment and Final Parenting Plan, R. pp. 98-106. 
5 Final Parenting Plan, R. pp. 52-58; Notice of Entry of Judgment, R. p.59. 
6 Parenting Plan, R. p.53. 
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and any other individuals regarding P .A.' s welfare. 7 The Parenting Plan contained a 
provision entitled "Custody Designation." This provision reads, 
CUSTODY DESIGNATION. That pursuant to 40-4-234(2)(a), MCA, 
Michelle shall be the custodian of the child solely for the purpose of all other 
State and Federal statutes that require a registration or determination of 
custody but the designation may not affect either parent's rights and 
responsibilities under the parenting plan. 8 
The Parenting Plan provided certain enumerated procedures in the event of a change 
in Michelle's or Ricky's residence which significantly affected P .A.' s contact with the other 
parent.9 The Parenting Plan further provided that neither party could change the residence of 
the child without a revised residential schedule accepted by the parties or established by 
mediation or court order. lo 
The Parenting Plan made no restrictions on travel. 
3. Michelle failed to deliver P.A. to Ricky on February 18,2008. 
Ricky's and Michelle's attorneys arranged for Ricky's visitations with P.A. for the 
month of February 2008. Michelle's attorney advised Ricky that Michelle would "drop 
off to Rick at their regular meeting location, the gas station in Rocker, MT (half way 
between Great Falls and Shelley) on Monday, February 18th at 12:00 p.m."ll 
7 Parenting Plan, R. p.S3. 
8 Parenting Plan, R. p.S8. 
9 Parenting Plan, R. p.SS. 
10 Parenting Plan, R. p.SS. 
11 Breifin Response to the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Change of Venue, Ex. A, R. p.92. 
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Ricky travelled to Rocker, Montana on February 18,2008. Michelle and P.A. failed 
to meet him. Ricky then drove to Shelly, Idaho and learned that Michelle and P.A. were no 
longer in Shelly, Idaho. 
Michelle left Bingham County on February 14,2008. Michelle never returned to 
Bingham County, Idaho until after her arrest in Oneida County, Idaho in November 2008. 
4. Michelle was charged with Kidnapping in the Second Degree. 
The State filed a criminal complaint against Michelle on June 5, 2008, alleging that 
she did lead, take, entice away or detain a child under the age of 16 years with the intent to 
keep or conceal the child from his/her custodial parent or other person having lawful care or 
control thereof. An arrest warrant issued. 
Michelle was arrested in the City of Malad, Oneida County, Idaho on November 2, 
2008. On June 23, 2009 the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal, whereby the 
Kidnapping charge was dismissed without prejudice. On October 8, 2010 the State refiled 
the Kidnapping charge against Michelle. The State's Criminal Complaint and the 
Prosecuting Attorney's Information read as follows: 
KIDNAPPING IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Felony, I.e. § 18-4501(2), 
18-4503 and 18-4504(2) 
committed as follows: 
Joan Michelle Anderson, on or about February 18, 2008, through June 5, 
2008, in Bingham County, Idaho, did lead, entice away or detain a child 
under the age of sixteen (16) years with the intent to keep or conceal it 
from its custodial parent or other person having lawful care or control 
thereof, to-wit: the defendant had custody of [P.A.l, born , 
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at or about 316 Hansen Lane, Shelly, Idaho, and thereafter took the child 
or detained the child to keep or conceal the child from the child's father 
Ricky J. Anderson, who is the custodial parent and/or lawful custodian of 
the child. 12 
5. This Court granted a permissive appeal as to the issue of whether a parent with 
visitation is a custodial parent under I.e. § 18-4501. 
On July 19, 2011 Michelle petitioned this Court to accept her permissive appeal 
pursuant to Rule 12 of three issues: (1) Whether a custodial mother could be charged with 
Kidnapping her own son when she fails to deliver the child to a father with visitation rights; 
(2) Whether venue is proper under § 19-307 where the only element of the alleged crime 
that occurred in the county is the prosecutor's assertion that the intent to commit the crime 
was formed within the county; and (3) Whether a mother is entitled to present the jury with 
the necessity defense when the basis for refusing the father his visitation rights was the 
father's abuse of the child. 13 
This Court granted the Appellant's motion as to the issue whether a parent with 
visitation rights is a custodial parent under I.C. 18-4501, but the motion was denied as the 
issues of venue and necessity. 14 
12 Criminal Complaint, R. p.6 (Oct. 10,2010); Prosecuting Attorney's Information, R. p.25-26 (Jan. 3,2011) 
(bold and capitalization in original). 
13 Brief in Support of Motion for Permissive Appeal and Leave to File Notice of Appeal (July 2011). 
14 Order Granting Motion for Permissive Appeal, Docket No. 38950-2011 (Aug. 12,2011). 
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ISSUES ON ApPEAL 
The issue this Court upon which this Court granted Michelle's permissive appeal, and a 
pivotal issue in this case is the following: : 
a. Whether, under the facts of this case, Ricky was a "custodial parent" for purposes 
Idaho Code § 18-4501(2). 
ARGUMENT 
1. This Court exercises free review over the interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-
4501(2). 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. The Supreme Court interprets statutes according to the plain, express meaning of the 
provision in question, and will resort to judicial construction only if the provision is 
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws. Peasley Tran:,fer & 
Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 979 P.2d 605 (1999). 
It is a fundamental law of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari materia 
are to be construed together, to the end that the legislative intent will be given effect. State 
v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367, 670 P.2d 463, 468 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 
S.Ct. 1327,79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984). Black's Law Dictionary Eight Edition defines "in pari 
materia" as "[o]n the same subject; relating to the same matter. It is a canon of construction 
that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in 
one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject." This Court 
has stated, "Where a statute with respect to one subject contains a certain provision, the 
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omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant 
to show that a different intention existed." Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 164, 595 P.2d 309, 
314 (1979). 
When attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, the court 
may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous context. 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214 (1999). Constructions ofa statute that would 
lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Payette River Property Owners 
Ass'n v. Board o.lComm'rs o/Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). lfthe 
legislature did not define terms used in a statute, the Legislature's intent must be determined 
from the statutory language and ordinary meaning of the terms. Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 
Idaho 434, 437, 196 P .3d 352, 355 (2008) (citing Ag Services of America, Inc. v. Kechter ex 
rei. Kechter, 13 7 Idaho 62, 44 P .3d 1117 (2002). 
In construing criminal statutes, courts are free to consider effect and consequence of 
differing and available constructions of a statute. State v. Webb, 76 Idaho 162,279 P.2d 634 
(1955); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689-690,85 P.3d 656,665 - 666 (2004). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, "well-settled principles of statutory 
construction require that, when a criminal statute is ambiguous, it must be strictly construed 
in favor of the defendant. This principle extends to the elements of the substantive crime. 
Any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity." State v. Roll, 118 Idaho 936, 939, 801 
P.2d 1287,1290 (Idaho App., 1990) (citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437, 614 
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P.2d 970,977 (1980) and Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812,91 S.Ct. 1056,1059, 
28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971 ». 
In State 11. Thompson this Court quoted the case of State v. Hahn, 92 Idaho 265, 267, 
441 P.2d 714,716 (1968). 
A statute defining a crime must be sufficiently explicit so that all persons 
subject thereto may know what conduct on their part will subject them to its 
penalties. A criminal statute must give a clear and unmistakable warning as to 
the acts which will subject one to criminal punishment, and courts are without 
power to supply what the legislature has left vague. An act cannot be held as 
criminal under a statute unless it clearly appears from the language used that 
the legislature so intended. 
State v. Thompson 101 Idaho at 437,614 P.2d at 977 (citations omitted in the original). 
2. Ricky's rights under the Parenting Plan did not include the rights of a 
"custodial parent" for purposes of Section 18-4501(2). 
a. The Parenting Plan gave Michelle "custody" and gave Ricky "parenting 
time." 
Immediately prior to the Montana court's issuance of the Parenting Plan, Ricky'S 
visitation with P.A. had been suspended due to concerns about P.A. 's safety while in 
Ricky's care. As stated above, the Parenting Plan reestablished Ricky's "parenting time" 
with P .A., but provided that Michelle maintained primary custody: 
RESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE. The child shall reside primarily with Michelle. 
Rick shall may [sic] have parenting time one week per month. After the child 
enters school, Rick's parenting time shall be two weekends per month. In 
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addition, after the child enters school, the parties shall divide equally the 
summer visitation period. IS 
The Parenting Plan also contained a provision entitled "Custody Designation." This 
provision provided that Michelle was the designated sole custodian of P .A. for purposes of 
all state and federal statutes that required a custody designation, but the provision did not 
affect Ricky's rights otherwise provided in the Parenting Plan. 
CUSTODY DESIGNATION. That pursuant to 40-4-234(2)(a), MCA, 
Michelle shall be the custodian of the child solely for the purpose of all other 
State and Federal statutes that require a registration or determination of 
custody but the designation may not affect either parent's rights and 
responsibilities under the parenting plan. 16 
The Parenting Plan provided certain enumerated procedures in the event of a change 
in Michelle's or Ricky's residence which significantly affected P.A.' s contact with the other 
parent. 17 The Parenting Plan further provided that neither party could change the residence 
of the child without a revised residential schedule accepted by the parties or established by 
mediation or court orderY The Parenting Plan made no restrictions on travel. 
h. In 1985 the Idaho legislature amended Section 18-4501(2) from "parent" to 
"custodial parent." 
Prior to 1985, Section 18-4501 (2) would have unambiguously applied to the facts of 
this case. The pre-198 5 Kidnapping statute provided that a person commits kidnapping if the 
individual has the "intent to keep or conceal [the child] from its parent." In 1985 the Idaho 
15 Parenting Plan, R. p.53. 
16 Parenting Plan, R. p.58. 
17 Parenting Plan, R. p.55. 
18 Parenting Plan, R. p.55. 
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Legislature amended Section 18-4501(2). A person commits kidnapping if the individual 
has the "intent to keep or conceal [the child] from its custodial parent.,,19 The obvious intent 
is the acknowledgement that one does not kidnap a child by merely intending to keep or 
conceal the child from its parent; in order to commit Kidnapping one must keep or conceal 
the child from its custodial parent. 
c. For purposes of Section 18-4501(2), the term "custodial parent" does not 
include "parenting time" or "visitation rights." 
The trial court ruled that Ricky's rights to visitation, as granted under the 
Parenting Plan, were sufficient to find that he was "custodial parent" for purposes of 
Section 18-4501(2).20 The trial court relied on the case of Web v. Web, 143 Idaho 
521,148 P.3d 1267 (2006). The portion of the Webb decision relied on by the trial 
court is as follows: 
The plain language of I.C. § 15-5-104 clearly provides that the parent of a 
child may delegate his or her powers regarding care, custody or property for a 
certain period of time depending on the status of the parent or designee. The 
plain language of the statute broadly applies to delegation of parental powers. 
Since the statute allows for delegations of custody, it is for us to decide 
whether the legislature intended this language to include delegation of 
visitation. 
We hold that it does. Neither I.C. § 15-5-104 nor Chapter 7, Title 32 of the 
Idaho Code defines visitation for child custody purposes. Nonetheless, 
Chapter 14, Title 7 of the Idaho Code defines visitation as "custodial period, 
custodial schedule, residential schedule, parenting, or parenting time." I. C. § 
7-1402(10). Therefore, it is clear from Idaho law that visitation is a form of 
19 Emphasis added. 
20 Decision and Order, R. pp. 314-2l. 
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custody, and the plain language of I.e. § 15-5-104 allows for the delegation 
of custody. As such, the magistrate did not err by allowing Christopher to 
delegate to the Webbs his custody rights to visitation with his daughters. 
Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho at 525, 148 P.3d at 1271. In this case, the trial court 
reasoned, "Based on Webb, under Idaho law, a parent having 'visitation rights' has a 
form of custody. As such, during authorized periods of visitation, that parent is a 
'custodial parent.' ,,21 
This reliance on Webb was error. Webb was a civil case interpreting an Idaho 
power-of-attorney statute dealing with the deiegation of parentai authority. The issue 
before the Court was whether the plain language of Section 15-5-104 was inclusive 
enough to include a father's ability to delegate visitation rights to his parents while 
he was deployed. In drafting Section 15-5-504, the Legislature stated that it applied 
to "parents or guardians"; the Legislature included as delegable powers under 
Section 15-5-104 "any of the parent's or guardian'S powers regarding care, custody, 
or property of the minor or ward.,,22 In short, Section 15-5-104's plain language 
indicated a legislative intent that "custody" would include "visitation." 
The criminal statute at issue in this case indicates no such legislative intent. When 
interpreting an ambiguous criminal statute, such as Section 18-4501(2), the statute must be 
"strictly construed in favor of the defendant." And, "[a]ny ambiguity should be resolved in 
favor oflenity." State v. Roll, 118 Idaho 936, 939, 801 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Idaho App., 1990) 
21 Decision and Order, R. p. 318. 
22 Emphasis added. 
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(citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437, 614 P.2d 970, 977 (1980) and Rewis v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 808,812,91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059,28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971». 
As stated by this Court, criminal statutes must give "clear and unmistakable warning 
as to the acts which will subject one to criminal punishment, and courts are without power 
to supply what the legislature has left vague. An act cannot be held as criminal under a 
statute unless it clearly appears from the language used that the legislature so intended." 
State v. Thompson 101 Idaho at 437, 614 P .2d at 977. 
In this case, Section 18-4501(2) is ambiguous. The term "custodial parent" could 
have any of several different meanings. "Custodial parent" could mean a parent with "legal 
custody," "physical custody," "joint custody," "sole custody," "temporary custody" or 
"permanent custody." The State argues that "custody" includes "visitation" and "parenting 
time." Unlike Webb, this statute must be strictly construed and any ambiguities in this case 
must be resolved in favor of the defendant, Michelle. 
Not only is Section 18-4501(2) ambiguous, the Parenting Plan is ambiguous as well. 
The Parenting Plan stated that P.A. would reside primarily with Michelle and that "Rick 
shall may [sic] have parenting time one week per month. ,,23 The Parenting Plan stated that 
"Michelle shall be the custodian of the child,,24 for purposes of "State and Federal statutes 
that require a registration or determination of custody," but Michelle's custodial designation 
did not affect Rick's rights or responsibilities under the Parenting Plan. 25 The Parenting Plan 
23 Parenting Plan, R. p.S3. 
24 Emphasis added. 
2S Parenting Plan, R. p.S8. 
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afforded both parents the right to make decisions as to P.A.' s welfare,26 while P .A.' s 
residence was to be several hundred miles from his father in a separate state. Again, it 
should be remembered that immediately prior to the Montana court issuing the Parenting 
Plan, the Montana court completely suspended Ricky's parental rights due to abuse 
27 
concerns. 
Given the ambiguities in both Section 18-4501 (2) and the Parenting Plan, the term 
"custodial parent" should be given a narrow, strict interpretation. Ricky was granted 
"parenting time." For purposes of Section 18-4501 (2), Ricky's parental rights should be 
interpreted as non-custodial and beyond the purview of Section 18-4501 (2). 
3. Section 18-4501(2) should be interpreted alongside Idaho's Custodial 
Interference statute. 
In Idaho, statutes that are in pari materia ("in the same matter") are to be construed 
together, to the end that the legislative intent will be given effect. State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 
at 367,670 P.2d at 468. Black's Law Dictionary Eight Edition states, "statutes that are in 
pari materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be 
resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject." This Court has stated, "Where a 
statute with respect to one subject contains a certain provision, the omission of such 
provision from a similar statute concerning a related subj ect is significant to show that a 
different intention existed." Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 164, 595 P .2d 309, 314 (1979). 
26 Parenting Plan, R. p.53. 
27 Order Suspending Father's Parenting Time, R. pp. 126-27. 
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In this case, the trial court failed to consider the significance of Idaho's Child 
Custody Interference Statute, Idaho Code § 18-4506 .. The trial court stated, 
The addition ofIdaho' s Child Custody Interference statute simply broadened 
the prosecutor's discretion in charging illegal parental custody actions, 
provided defenses for certain actions, and availed the State of federal 
investigative resources. The history does nothing to clarify the term 'custodial 
interference' [ custodial parent]. 28 
Idaho's Custodial Interference statute does more than "simply broaden the prosecutor's 
discretion in charging illegal parental custody actions." 
The Custodial Interference statute indicates a legislative intent to protect the rights of 
parents not included under Idaho's Kidnapping statute-the Custodial Interference statute 
protects the rights of non-custodial parents from actions on the part of custodial parents. The 
defenses provided and punishments affixed are an acknowledgement by the Legislature that 
a parent keeping a child from another parent is a fundamentally different crime than when a 
child is abducted by a complete stranger. 
a. Idaho's Child Custody Interference statute includes the terms "parent" 
"custody" "joint custody" "visitation" and "other parental rights." 
It is clear from the express language of Section 18-4506 that it was intended to have 
a much broader reach than Idaho's kidnapping statute. In particular, the custodial 
interference statute protects rights not included under the kidnapping statute. It protects the 
rights of parents with "joint custody, visitation or other parental rights." It states in pertinent 
part, 
28 Decision and Order, R. p. 32l. 
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A person commits child custody interference if the person, whether a parent 
or other, or agent of that person, intentionally and without lawful authority: 
(a) Takes, entices away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a parent or 
another person or institution having custody, joint custody, visitation or other 
parental rights, whether such rights arise from temporary or permanent 
custody order, or from the equal custodial rights of each parent in the absence 
of a custody order; 
I.e. § 18-4506. The explicit language of the statute covers "joint custody, visitation or other 
parental rights." The inclusion of this language shows an intention to cover a broader set of 
circumstances than Idaho's kidnapping statute. 
b. Idaho's Custodial Interference statute provides defenses not included under 
Idaho's Kidnapping statute. 
The Legislature provided certain defenses under the Custodial Inteference statute not 
included under the Kidnapping statute. These include the following: 
It shall be an affirmative defense to a violation of the provisions of subsection 
1. of this section that: 
(a) The action is taken to protect the child from imminent physical harm; 
(b) The action is taken by a parent fleeing from imminent physical harm to 
himself; 
(c) The action is consented to by the lawful custodian of the child; or 
(d) The child is returned within twenty-four (24) hours after expiration of an 
authorized visitation privilege. 
I.e. § 18-4506. These defenses indicate an acknowledgement on the part of the Legislature 
that there are often mitigating circumstances when a custodial parent withholds a child from 
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the non-custodial parent. When a custodial parent is charged with Kidnapping, the 
Legislature's intent in providing the above defenses to parents is eviscerated. 
In this case, Michelle was afraid for her child's safety should she tum the child over 
to Ricky. Idaho's Kidnapping statute provides her no defenses. Michelle moved the trial 
court to allow her present a necessity defense to the jury. The trial court denied that motion. 
Because Michelle was charged with Kidnapping rather than Custodial Interference, she has 
been denied a set of defenses that the Legislature clearly intended to provide custodial 
parents when they are charged with withholding a child from the non-custodial parent. 
c. Idaho's Custodial Interference statute is an acknowledgment by the Legislature 
that a child taken by its custodial parent is not a kidnapped child. 
Idaho's passage of the Custodial Interference statute in 1987 is an acknowledgement 
that a parent taking a child from another parent is fundamentally different than when a child 
is abducted by a complete stranger. The Maryland court of appeals faced the issue of 
whether a father could be charged with Child Abduction or whether that law was trumped 
by the state's Child Abduction by a Relative statute. State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 695 
A.2d 143 (Md., 1997). The Maryland court's reasoning is instructive. 
In Ghajari, the father and mother had a separation agreement wherein the mother 
received "custody" and the father received "reasonable visitation." The father was not 
allowed to leave the state with the children. Contrary to the separation agreement, the father 
took his two children, a five-year old and a seven-year old, to Iran and remained there for 
three and a half years. 
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The Maryland court of appeals was faced with the issue of whether the children's 
father could be charged with the harsher charge of Child Abduction, or whether the 
Maryland legislature intended such cases (cases where a child is taken from a parent by a 
parent) to fall under Maryland's more lenient charge of Child Abduction by a Relative. The 
Maryland court ruled that the father could not be charged with Child Abduction in 
Maryland. Underlying Maryland court's rationale was the reasoning that when the Maryland 
legislature enacted the Child Abduction by a Relative statute, the legislature was 
acknowledging that a child taken by a parent is a fundamentally different situation than 
when a child is taken by a stranger. The Maryland court reasoned thus: 
The Criminal Law Commission [Maryland Criminal Law Commission] 
expressed a similar sentiment when it stated: 
'Custodial and non-custodial kidnappings: Some modern codes remove 
from the general crimes of kidnapping and unlawful detention the 
special case of custodial interference, that is, the case in which the 
defendant is trying to change the custody of the child or incompetent 
and restrains or abducts him for this reason. This is a different kind of 
crime; the defendant does not think of his act as harmful to the child, 
is usually a relative, and does not arouse the same kind of alarm in the 
other relatives as in other kinds of unlawful detention.' 
Maryland Comm'n on Criminal Law, Report and Part I of the Proposed 
Criminal Code, at 197. The Commission suggested that it would prefer to 
treat custodial interference as a separate offense from all other child 
abductions and detentions. The first reason offered for this preference was 
that" '[ t ]he interest protected is not freedom from physical danger or 
terrorization by abduction, ... but rather the maintenance of parental custody 
against all unlawful interruption .... ' " ld. (quoting Model Penal Code § 212.4 
(Tentative Draft No. 11, 1960». The second reason was that custodial 
interference could appropriately carry less severe sanctions than all other 
detentions. ld. 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF -22-
State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 695 A.2d 143 (Md., 1997). 
Similarly in Idaho, the Idaho Legislature enacted the Custodial Interference statute 
and deliberately made the statute applicable when a custodial parent takes a child from a 
non-custodial parent. The Custodial Interference statute was written broadly to cover 
situations where the child is taken from a parent with "visitation or other parenting rights." 
Idaho's Custodial Interference statute indicates a legislative intent that a custodial parent 
taking a child from the non-custodial parent is a different crime than Kidnapping. 
In this case, Micheile faiied to deiiver P.A. to Ricky because she was fearful for 
P.A.'s safety. Ricky's visitation rights had been temporarily suspended for the period of 
time immediately preceding the Parenting Plan. Michelle was reluctant to return P.A. for his 
visitation under such circumstances. The Idaho legislature enacted Idaho's Custodial 
Interference statute (and its defenses) to cover such a circumstance. 
4. This Court may consider the consequences of interpreting Section 18-4501, both 
the consequences in this case as well as custody disputes throughout the state. 
In construing criminal statutes, courts are free to consider the effects and 
consequences of differing and available constructions of a statute. State v. Webb, 76 Idaho 
162,279 P.2d 634 (1955); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho at 689-690, 85 P.3d at 665-66. This 
Court's interpretation of Section 18-4501(2) affects this case as well as custody disputes 
throughout Idaho. 
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In this case, allowing Section 18-4501 to apply against Michelle works at least two 
injustices. First, had a complete stranger abducted P.A., that stranger would be charged no 
differently than Michelle. Charging Michelle, a custodial parent, with Kidnapping fails to 
acknowledge the distinction of a mother taking a child and child abduction by a stranger. 
Second, allowing Michelle to be charged with Section 18-4501 prohibits her from 
presenting her defense-that P .A. was being abused by Ricky and that the child was in 
imminent danger if she released P .A. to Ricky.29 The trial court has refused to allow 
Michelle to present a necessity defense to the jury. If Michelle were charged with Custodial 
Interference, she would be allowed to present her defense. 
This Court's construction of Section 18-4501 has ramifications throughout Idaho. 
The State proposes that prosecutors should have discretion to charge parents with 
kidnapping when the custodial parent fails to deliver a child to the non-custodial parent. 
This interpretation grants every aggrieved parent in the state the ability to involve 
kidnapping investigations every time a child is not delivered for visitation time. It would 
obligate police to investigate and prosecute such kidnapping allegations. The State's 
interpretation is an open invitation for police and prosecutors to get involved in nearly every 
custody dispute in this state. 
To be certain, custodial parents can violate parenting plans and be found in 
contempt. In egregious situations, custodial parents can commit Custodial Interference. But, 
29 Decision and Order, R. pp. 323-331. 
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a parent with custodial rights to her child cannot be charged with Kidnapping if she refuses 
the father his visitation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Michelle respectfully petitions this Court to interpret 
Section 18-4501(2) so as to preclude its application against custodial parents when they fail 
to deliver their children to the non-custodial parent. 
DATED: December 5,2011 
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